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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 47-6-248
TITLE:             The Budapest Cultural Forum: Heritage, Diversity, Freedom
BY:                
DATE:              1985-10-11
COUNTRY:           Poland
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  RAD Background Report/117

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO LIBERTY

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

RAD Background Report/117
(Eastern Europe)
11 October 1985

THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM: HERITAGE, DIVERSITY, FREEDOM

Page

INTRODUCTION	2
by Mihajlo Mihajlov
BULGARIA	9
by G. S.	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	15
by Antonin Kratochvil	
HUNGARY	21
by Steven Koppany	
POLAND	29
by S. M. M.	
ROMANIA	35
by Anneli Maier	

This material was prepared for the use of the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

[page 2]

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INTRODUCTION

From 15 October to 25 November 1985 the Conference on
Security and Cooperation--Cultural Forum, which is one of a
series of experts' meetings organized as part of the follow-up
process to the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), will be held in Budapest. The agreements on
cultural matters--part of the so-called Third Basket--of the
Helsinki Final Act recognized that cultural exchanges and
cooperation could "contribute to a better comprehension among
people and among peoples, and thus promote a lasting
understanding among states." This view was reiterated at the
CSCE follow-up meeting that ended in Madrid in September 1983,
and it was then decided that the Cultural Forum would be
arranged to discuss various aspects of cultural cooperation,
especially the promotion and expansion of international contacts
and exchanges. Both in Helsinki and in Madrid, the participants
pledged to encourage the translation and publication of books
from other countries, particularly those in less widely spoken
languages, cooperation between radio and television
organizations, and the protection of the countries' historical
monuments and national heritage.

Given the different conceptions and roles of culture in
Western and Soviet-type societies, the agenda of the Cultural
Forum will inescapably focus on questions of free artistic
expression; the free communication of ideas; the jamming of
Western radio stations; freedom of travel for cultural
exchanges; freedom of publications; official policy toward the
national heritage; the unhindered development of national
minorities; and questions concerning religious freedom. In
short, East-West discussion of cultural matters is inseparably
linked with basic East-West differences over questions of human
rights.

Differing Eastern and Western conceptions of culture had
already given rise to heated exchanges at the preparatory
meeting for the forum, which was held in Budapest late last
year. The Western negotiators proposed that the agenda of the
forum should be divided into three parts: dealing with the
creative process, the dissemination of culture, and
international cooperation in the arts. The East European
diplomats wanted the agenda to be divided into different forms
of culture, without qualifications, a procedure calculated to
diminish the possibility of raising the matter of cultural
freedom. The West also proposed that delegations to the forum
should include eminent practicing writers and other artists,
while the communist negotiators wanted the delegations to be
comprised of state bureaucrats. The final agreed agenda divided
the forum into four categories: the plastic and applied arts
{including the preservation of cultural and historical
monuments); the performing arts (including film, radio, and
television); literature (including translations, especially of
less widely spoken languages); and mutual cultural knowledge.

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The delegations will comprise both government officials and
leading artists. All meetings will be closed to the public
except for the opening and closing sessions.

The topics for discussion at Budapest, according to recent
statements by Western and Eastern diplomats, will be closely
related to those treated at the recent Ottawa review conference
on human rights, another in the CSCE follow-up series.
Ambassador Walter Stoessel, head of the US delegation to
Budapest, said that he would be satisfied if the forum led to "a
little more freedom in exchanges and book exhibits and
television."[1] On the other hand, the Soviets have underscored
their usual position that human rights are internal affairs of
sovereign states by saying that "the Cultural Forum can be
successful only if its participants respect the statement is in
the Helsinki Final Act regarding nonintervention in the internal
affairs of other countries and the sovereignty of states."[2]

Notwithstanding occasional important differences, all
Marxist societies share a similar concept of culture, especially
of the role of literature, films, and television. This
conception is derived from the Marxist tenet that man's
intellectual and spiritual production is, in fact, only a
"superstructure," reflecting a fundamental social reality,
namely, existing human relations in the sphere of material
production. Thus, culture and religion are said to be mere
reflections of basic social relationships. In the capitalist
world, man is said to be alienated from his real essence because
of the existence of private ownership in the economic sphere,
and this alienation is reflected in the "superstructure," that
is, religion and culture in general. According to this
conception, after the proletarian revolution led by the
communist party--the vanguard of the proletariat--the basic
foundation of society is changed. Private ownership of the
means of production is abolished and all forms of alienation are
removed. Religion, as a reflection of alienated human spirit,
is also supposed to disappear. In the resulting new society or
"kingdom of freedom" all individuals are supposed to have the
capability and leisure to be culturally creative, not simply
professional artists, as was the case in prerevolutionary
societies. Given the unlimited possibilities for development of
this new society, culture is supposed to be optimistic and
atheistic and in the service of the proletarian class, which,
for all practical purposes, means the ruling communist party.

A decade and a half after the communist takeover in Russia,
a new theory of art was created. Stalin was the first to coin
its name: "socialist realism."[3] This theory was first applied
to literature but was later extended to embrace all spheres of
culture. It stipulated that all culture, but especially
literature, plays, and films, had to reflect in their depiction
of reality even the smallest seeds and signs of the splendid
future of communist society and in this way support the party's
efforts in building communism. The theory envisaged the artist

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RAD BR/117

as someone who fulfills "social" orders, that is, party orders.
In short, the theory, by defining artistic activity as social
activity, subordinated the artist to the communist party, or,
more precisely, its Central Committee.

After Stalin's death, and particularly after the 20th CPSU
Congress in 1956, the theory and practice of "socialist realism"
were somewhat diluted in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Several
Marxist theorists (for example, the French Marxist Roger

Garaudy) concluded that the reality that is supposed to be
reflected in art and literature is not only social reality but
also the reality represented by the artist's inner world. This
thesis opened the door for lyric expression and modernistic
forms of art. Whereas a decade ago exhibitions of abstract
paintings in Moscow were ploughed under by bulldozers, now
groups of modernistic artists are occasionally allowed to
exhibit their paintings semiofficially. Whereas in Stalin's
time even musical works by Prokofiev and Shostakovich were
attacked in Pravda as expressions of hostility toward society,
in other words, the ruling party, now only literature, plays,
films, and television are, for the most part, subjected to close
scrutiny and censorship by the party. Whereas in previous times
even love songs in the modern style were considered
individualistic and antisocial, now, even in the USSR, all
literary styles are officially accepted if they do not contain
political criticism. As a result, the last decade has witnessed
something akin to what transpired in the USSR in the first
decade after the October Revolution, in that some Soviet and
East European writers have been allowed to publish in the West
without official harassment, so long as their publications are
devoid of political criticism.

Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe free
cultural activity is linked more to practical freedom than to
Marxist theory of the nature of culture. Cultural creativity
requires freedom: freedom of expression; freedom of publishing,
freedom for the circulation of ideas; freedom for travel; and so
on.

If it is possible to imagine a successful scientific
research Institute where the researchers are prisoners (such as
Solzhenitsyn depicted in his novel The First Circle), it is
absolutely impossible to establish a prison for artists and
authors and to expect that it will give rise to the creation of
great art. Art needs freedom, or to quote Heinrich Boell:
"Literature does not request freedom, literature is freedom."
Precisely for this reason, art and literature have fared ill in
communist countries.

For this reason also, the destiny of creative individuals
more often than not has been a tragic one in the Soviet and East
European countries, since it has in the main been shaped by
arbitrary party decisions and directives and unexpected changes
of the "general line."

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Initially, many artists believed that the new social order
resulting from the communist revolution would free artists of
their dependence on publishers and owners of galleries and their
ability to sell their artistic works. Indeed, some forms of the
arts prospered in the first decade after the October Revolution
in Russia. There were dozens of gifted artists engaged in
literature, the performing arts, and films. At that time, it
was possible to live in Moscow and publish a book in Western
Europe (including what is today "Eastern" Europe), or even vice
versa/ Many subsequently renowned Soviet writers were emigrants
(for example, Maksim Gorky, Ilya Erenburg, and Aleksei Tolstoi).
At that time books and ideas, for the most part, circulated
freely. All this, however, disappeared with the rise of Stalin
and the imposition of total control over all spheres of society,
including the cultural sphere. As a result, during this period
many artists committed suicide (for example, Mayakovsky and
Esenin); hundreds were arrested and executed or died in
concentration camps (such as Isaak Babel, Boris Pilnyak, and
Osip Mandelstamm); and a few were allowed to emigrate (Evgenii
Zamyatin, for example). Thousands of others were forced to
accept "socialist realism" or to keep silent.

Nothing better shows the link between genuine artistic and
cultural activity and basic human freedom than the periods of
liberalization in communist states. After 1956, and especially
after 1962 (when Stalin was strongly condemned at the 22nd CPSU
Congress and his body removed from the mausoleum in Red Square),
dozens of books, plays, and films of real artistic merit
suddenly appeared in the Soviet Union. When the wave of
liberalization ended, artistic activity was forced underground
and samizdat culture was born. The same pattern was evident in
the East European countries, where art and culture followed the
course first charted in the USSR.

Today, the cultural situation in the USSR and Eastern
Europe is generally similar. Most important artistic creations
are part of the underground culture or only appear in the West.
Hundreds of artists have been forced to emigrate. Of course,
there are differences in the degree of cultural freedom that
exists in the East European countries. In Romania, despite its
independence from Moscow in some areas, art and culture are
subject to constraints no less severe than those that existed in
the USSR under Stalin. Cultural activities in Yugoslavia,
Hungary, and Poland (in the last case, underground activities)
are more numerous than in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the USSR.
In all these countries, however, art and culture are suppressed,
though the degree of suppression varies from time to time, from
situation to situation, and from one aspect of cultural activity
to another. This is especially true of the right of national
minorities to enjoy and study their own cultural patrimony and
to practice their particular national and religious traditions
and of the right of entire populations to engage in unrestricted
cultural exchanges with foreign countries, both in the East and
in the West.

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It is also interesting to note the changes in official
party policy on the national historical heritage and patrimony,
given the fact that the Communists came to power in most
countries after fighting with nationalist forces in civil wars
(as in the USSR and Yugoslavia) or in War World II (as in
Poland). Initially, the party opposed any rebirth of national
sentiments or even memory. Past history was rewritten several
times in order to justify the party's monopoly of power. Even
today, in almost all the East European countries dozens of
historical and cultural personalities are still "nonpersons."
Under Stalin, a similar fate almost befell Dostoyevsky.

In one respect, however, the situation today is somewhat
different. There are signs that the communist parties in many
communist countries are trying to fill a vacuum left by the
disappearance of faith in communist ideology with a strange
mixture of nationalism cleansed of all democratic traditions.
The Stalinist slogan that culture is supposed to be "nationalist
in form but with a socialist content" is no longer strictly
observed.

Cultural policy toward national minorities has undergone a
similar change. Initially the Communists used to permit and
even encourage minority cultural traditions and languages as
allies in the struggle against the nationalism of the
majorities. Now this situation has changed. Stalin personally
ordered the new policy and vigorously implemented it during and
after World War II, when, for example, between 1949 and 1952
Jewish culture was virtually eliminated in the USSR.

The situation of the religious minorities is similar. The
degree of freedom enjoyed by believers and the Churches depends
on the current policy, which must always conform to the official
policy of atheism, adherence to which is a prerequisite for any
career in communist states, including an artistic career.
Folklore (dance and songs) is the one exception in the cultural
life of Marxist states, since it has always received official
support. The Soviet Union and the East European countries can
boast of many brilliant professional folklore groups. Their
existence is supposed to legitimate the national traditions of
the "workers' party."

Cultural exchanges with the Western world depend on the
prevailing international climate. During the period of detente
they were more frequent than in that following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, propaganda attacks on
Western "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois mass culture"
remain a permanent feature in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, even in the more liberal countries such as Yugoslavia.

Mihajlo Mihajlov

* * *

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1 RFE Correspondent's Report (Washington), 4 October 1985.

2 RFE Correspondent's Report (Budapest), 23 November 1984.

3 V. Ozerov, Na Putjah Socialisticheskogo Realizes [Following the Course of
Socialist Realism] (Moscow: 1958), p. 13.

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BULGARIA

Cultural Patrimony. During the first years after the
communist takeover, the regime took a dim view of the
pre-September 1944 cultural heritage. Years later the regime
realized its mistake in dismissing many of the precommunist
cultural achievements, although all along it had selected
certain ideological values and scientific breakthroughs to use
for its own ends.[1] By the time the regime had changed its
attitude, however, irreversible damage had been done to
archives, libraries, and churches.

As early as 1952 work began on setting up a uniform state
museum network. By 1958 the Council of Ministers issued a
decree on establishing guidelines for preserving "the monuments
of culture."[2] Although not always strictly observed, the

document was responsible for saving a great amount of historical
material. According to the latest available data, there are now
227 state museums in Bulgaria and some 500 museum collections at
various community centers, enterprises, and monasteries.[3] in
addition, there are 74 museum houses, that is, memorial museums
dedicated to prominent Bulgarian cultural and political figures.
It is impossible to tell, however, how much of these are devoted
to the the purely communist past, that is, prominent party
figures of the pre-1944 resistance period. All these
institutions contain more than 3,500,000 valuable objects. In
addition, the museums' staffs carry out systematic research and
excavations; they also publish yearbooks, monographs, and other
publications.

From the regime's point of view, the museums must carry out
propagandists, educational, and scientific activities through
their permanent and special exhibitions, In order to secure its
complete control over the museums (and related institutions),
the regime put them under control of the the Committee on
Culture, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, and the local
authorities.

In general, historical monuments and mementoes of old times
are properly preserved and accessible.[4] In the last two or
three decades much effort has been devoted to the restoration of
churches and icons. The most distant past is also subject to
particular attention, and archaelogical excavations are under
way at many historical sites. The same cannot be said, however,
of the historical archives of modern Bulgarian history,
particularly those related to the party's past and present
activities. They are not readily accessible to the general
public.

As far as pre-1944 arts (literature, theater, fine arts)
are concerned, it is true that particulary over the last 20
years the regime has rehabilitated a number of authors and
cultural figures, who used to be condemned in the past as
bourgeois or ideologically unacceptable. Of course, their work

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is presented from the regime's point of view and often
accompanied by long Marxist-Leninist explanations and
interpretation. There are, of course, Bulgarian authors who are
still waiting to be "discovered11 by the reading public; for

example, Raiko Alexiev, Yordan Badev, Hristo Ganev, Bogdan
Filov, Yordan Kovachev, Trifon Kunev, Georgi Markov, Chavdar
Mutafov, Atanas Slavov, Vladimir Vasilev, Boris Yotsov--to
mention only a few of them.

The pre-communist past does not find its adequate
reflection in present-day literature, plays, and movies. It is
continually distorted in order to suit the regime's political
goals at any given moment. Thus, history books and literary
works are seldom objective and often contradict historical

facts. In a word, they serve the regime's short-term
policies.[5]

Yet it should be stressed that the fine and applied arts as
well as music are the fields in which the greatest creative
freedom can be detected. Modern Bulgarian musicians and artists
are allowed bold experiments and, as a result, they are
recognized all over the world. This trend became visible in the
mid-1970s and is still growing. Justifiably or not, Bulgaria's
opening to the West is still being attributed to late Lyudmila
Zhivkova.[6] As a result of her personal efforts, Bulgarian art
exhibitions have been arranged in London, New York, Boston,
Tokyo, Mexico City, Munich, Stuttgart, and elsewhere. The works
of Bulgarian artists received prestigious international prizes,
for example, in Venice, Paris, and Prague.[7] At the same time,
Bulgarian opera stars triumph on the stages of the greatest
opera houses all over the world.

Bulgarian folklore received its due from the very beginning
of the communist takeover in September 1944. Its pagan (Slav,
proto-Bulgarian, and Thracian) threads are interwoven with
Christian ideas and images. Under the communist rule, however,
the pagan elements have been emphasized at the expense of the
Christian ones. The regime also stresses time and again one of
the main characteristics of Bulgarian folkore: the fact that the
Bulgarian nation persevered even during times of foreign
domination. Under the impact of historical events its type and
purpose changed. The new urban culture, which first appeared
during the National Revival Period (the 18th and the 19th
centuries), drew upon the regional forms of folklore and gave
rise to new artistic works. Today, folkloric culture is no
longer regional; it is an inseparable part of the national

culture.

The modern times and, above all, the communist rule with
its professed allegiance to atheism and "proletarian
internationalism" weakened to a great extent the role and
influence of folklore; all this led to a loss of many folkloric
traditions. For example, oral and musical folklore and folk
crafts do not exist any more in their original forms. They are

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artificially kept alive by various amateur artistic groups and
by the occasional attention they are given in the media.
Craftsmen's workshops have been restored, but they have hardly
revived folk crafts. The importance of folklore in the artistic
life of today's Bulgaria is greatly diminished, After the
communist takeover the authorities placed Bulgarian folkloric
studies on "new Marxist methodological foundations,"[8] Since
1973 the collecting, cataloguing, and publishing of folkloric
materials has been concentrated mainly within the Institute of
Folklore of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

For quite some time, the regime has been trying to replace
some of the centuries-old Christian folk traditions (that is,
baptismal, wedding, and funeral rites) with the so-called
"socialist rituals," but not very successfully.[9]

Cultural Diversity. Respect for different ethnic, and
religious cultures is virtually nonexistent in Bulgaria today,
with the possible exception of the tolerance shown to the very
small Bulgarian Jewish and Armenian minorities.[10] The regime
has been especially cruel to the Bulgarian ethnic Turks and to
the so-called Bulgarian Moslems (the Pomaks). The drive against
the Pomaks began sometime in the late 1960s and intensified in
the early 1970s.[11] Officially, there are no Pomaks in Bulgaria
today.

The plight of the Bulgarian ethnic Turks recently erupted
in a worldwide scandal, and their plight might still have very
serious consequences on the international scene, not only in the
Balkans, Since late 1984 the Bulgarian regime has begun a
massive campaign against Bulgaria's ethnic Turkst it started
forcibly changing their Moslem names into Bulgarian ones. The
campaign provoked violent clashes between the authorities and
the ethnic Turks. As a result, it has been declared ex
cathedra that: "There are no Turks in Bulgaria."[12]

One of the most notorious violations of intellectual
freedom is the attitude to the Turkish minority's cultural
heritage. The closing down of Turkish schools and the abolition
of publications in the Turkish language are aimed at
annihilating Turkish ethnic identity. At the same time, such
acts are flagrant violations of the Constitution (Article 45,
Paragraph 7): "In addition to the mandatory study of the
Bulgarian language, the citizens of non-Bulgarian origin have
the right to study their own [mother] tongue."[13] The Turkish
language is no longer allowed to be spoken in public. There
have also recently been official statements about the intention
to step up antireligious propaganda among Moslems.

The regime's present-day policy of "creating a single
socialist nation"--that is, a policy of assimilation of all
ethnic minorities--has been most consistently followed ever
since the idea was conceived at the 10th party congress in April
1971.[14]

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Openings Toward the West. Cultural contacts between
Bulgaria and the rest of the world are governed by bilateral
agreements that preclude any one-on-one contacts. If such
contacts are allowed at all, they are exceptions. For instance,
guest performances of Bulgarian opera stars are controlled by a
special agency, which also imposes heavy taxes on the singers1
income in hard currency.

Since the 1975 Helsinki Conference there have been ups and
downs in Bulgaria's cultural exchanges with the West.
Exhibitions from Western museums, Western film festivals, and
Western guest performances, for example, have been very
selective. Access to Western literature is limited to a few
names; the same selective method is being applied to movies and
television programs. Only Western pop music enjoys relatively
easier access to the general public through radio and
television, but it is subjected to sporadic severe attacks and
administrative sanctions, which most often prove to be
counterproductive.

The main impediments on the road to unfettered cultural
contacts have always been ideological and political. The regime
follows, more or less closely, the Soviet pattern, but it should
be noted that the cultural contacts between Bulgaria and the
West seem to be livelier, more diverse, and more relaxed than
those between the USSR and the West, with the possible exception
of translated Western literature.

G. S.

* * *

1 Otechestven front, 11 January 1970; Rabotnichesko Delo, 7 March and 11
June 1980; Narodna Hladezh, 11 August 1961; Rabotnichesko Dale, 11
March and 19 November 1962 and 30 January 1963.

2 Cf., Izvestiya na Prezidiuma na Narodnoto Sabrania, nos, 68 and 71, 26
August 1958 and 4 September 1959, respectively.

3 Rabotnichesko Delo, 14 May 1984; and also Information Bulgaria, a short
encyclopedia of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, ed. by the Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1965), pp. 836-847.

4 Cf., Bulgarian Situation Report/6, Radio Free Europe Research, 11 April
1984, item 2.

5 Cf., Information Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 698-739.

6 See Yordan Kerov, "Lyudmila Zhivkova--Fragments of a Portrait," RAD
Background Report/253 (Bulgaria), RFER, 27 October 1980.

7 Information Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 740-752.
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8 Ibid., p. 697.

9 Cf., Bulgarian SR/16, RFER, 23 November 1984, item 2.

10 Ibid., no. 6, 3 May 1985, item 2.

11 Ibid., no. 31 and 5, 27 August 1970 and 21 February 1974, items 2 in both
cases; see also Dennis Hupchick, "Bulgaria's Moslem Minority Troubles in
the Context of Balkan History," RAD BR/26 (Bulgaria), RFER, 29 March
1985.

12 For more details see, Bulgarian SRs/2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, RFER, 30 January,
15 February, 6 and 28 March, and 29 June 1985, items 1, 1, 1, 1, and 2,
respectively.

13 Darzhaven Vestnik, no. 39, 18 May 1971.

14 See G. S., "Bulgarian Plenum Devoted to Ideological Activity," Bulgarian
BR/3, RFER 19 April 1974, pp. 12-14; and Bulgarian SR/2, RFER, 21
January 1976, item 2.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Cultural Patrimony. The Czechoslovak communist regime's
attitude to cultural and religious trends is basically the same
as that adopted by the communist party before its seizure of
power (it changed only briefly during the Prague Spring in
1968). The Communists gradually usurped the right to judge,
condemn, or abolish everything that in earlier periods had
contradicted or criticized the theory and practice of
Marxism-Leninism. The approach adopted by communist ideologues
to history consisted essentially of concentrating on those
periods that could be used for the objectives of the class
struggle and that promoted the aims of communist theory and
practice.[1]

This is exemplified in the attitude of the regime to
architectural and literary monuments. This was expressed not
merely in the gradual dilapidation of numerous baroque monuments
(churches, monasteries, stately homes, and parks containing
sculptures by famous artists), which were left to their fate and
neglected, but also by the actual closure or demolition (or
designation for other uses) of many churches, synagogues, and
monasteries, including their libraries, as part of the
authorities' periodic atheistic campaigns. Castles and the
historic sections of many cities head a long list of public
sites that are in a state of disrepair as a consequence of
several decades of neglect; among them is Prague's old city,
which has become "a mere warehouse."[2]

The story of neglect that has now come to light shows that,
because of economic constraints, the leadership is simply not in
a position to act as the principal caretaker in a country so
rich in national heritage as Czechoslovakia. Moreover, its
political stance makes it less inclined to spend vast sums of
money on symbols of the country's precommunist past. Places and
items reminiscent of the first President, Thomas G. Masaryk, or
the Slovak patriotic general Milan R. Stefanik and many others
have virtually disappeared from the cultural map of present-day
Czechoslovakia. For a time Czechoslovakia considered becoming a
member of the UNESCO International Convention on the Protection
of the World Heritage, but the government eventually decided not
to sign the document because of the high membership fees payable
in hard currency.

A similar but perhaps even more tragic situation exists in
literature. The number of books banned in the 1970s can only be
guessed at. The literary purges of the 1950s occurred in three
stages. Official sources suggest that from 1948 to 1955 more
than 27,500,000 books were pulped.[3] To this number must be
added the books confiscated by the security agencies. The first
list of books to be withdrawn from libraries was issued as early
as 9 October 1948 and others followed in 1949 and 1950. The
third list included the works by Thomas G. Masaryk. Public
access to precommunist literature is also limited.

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The state of folklore and folk culture is not as bad. Under
the Communists folklore became a new academic discipline, the
purpose of which was to study the prospects of assimilating it
into the mainstream of social development under socialism. Folk
songs and dance in particular flourished. Some music and dance
ensembles turned professional and achieved international acclaim
(for example, the Slovak Lucnica ensemble based in Bratislava).
Various festivals of amateur theater (the amateur artists are
frequently supervised by professional directors) have also been
very successful. The amateur theater is not obliged to address
political themes to the same extent as the professional theater.
Nonetheless, since 1948 folk culture has been impoverished by
the loss of one important aspect: pilgrimage songs, which
traditionally constituted an integral part of folklore, and
which, with the obstructions placed in the way of pilgrimages by
the authorities, are now becoming a thing of the past.
Moreover, ethnic customs connected with christenings, weddings,
and other religious ceremonies are being replaced by socialist
symbols and observances.

The precommunist past is reflected in contemporary
literature, theater, and films only insofar as it coincides with
the cultural and ideological designs of the regime, A notable
example of this was the commemoration of the 1,1000th anniversary
of the death of Saint Methodius, when the state distorted the
significance of his and his brother's mission by concentrating
on Cyril and Methodius as founders of the Slavic culture rather
than on their missionary activities.[4]

Cultural Diversity. The approach adopted toward various
ethnic groups, minorities, and religious communities varies in
accordance with the political interests of the authorities. The
Hungarian minority, for example, is tolerated and ethnic
Hungarian literature is well developed. The Union of Slovak
Writers has a Hungarian section. An extensive network of
cultural and educational institutions has been set up over the
years for the Hungarian minority. The minority's concern about
being ethnically oppressed and forced to assimilate into the
Slavic population in Czechoslovakia appears to be somewhat
exaggerated but not totally unjustified. It is, rather, the
indirect and more sophisticated ethnic discrimination combined
with the generally oppressive political climate that disturbs
the ethnic Hungarians.[5] The Ukrainians in eastern Slovakia
also have their own press and a National Theater in Presov. The
German minority in Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, is
virtually ignored.

The social integration of Gypsies in Czechoslovakia is
being carried out at the cost of diminishing their ethnic
identity and cultural traditions. That the Gypsies have felt
threatened has been documented in the past by their efforts to
establish their own organization for the protection of their
interests in the wake of the Prague Spring. Eventually, on 27
April 1969, the Union of Gypsies and Romanies was founded in

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Bratislava, and a Czech chapter was established the following
June. After four years, however, it was banned by the
regime.[6]

The Catholic Church, one of the major Churches in the
country, has been under strong pressure. Ever since the
communist takeover the production of religious literature has
been reduced to a minimum. To alleviate the situation it was
announced in February of this year that some 200,000 copies of
the Bible, 70,000 catechisms, and 400,000 hymn books are to be
published (the latest edition of the Bible came out in 1970).[7]
The regime allows the publishing of one religious weekly and one
religious monthly in Czech and Slovak, both of which are
subjected to strong ideological censorship. Religious
literature, plays, films, and the fine arts are virtually
nonexistent. For about four decades almost no churches have
been built. The resources allocated for the reconstruction of
church buildings in Slovakia amounted to about 20,000,000 koruny
in 1984 (while 400,000,000 koruny was spent on the restoration
of other cultural monuments in Slovakia), a very inadequate
budget.[8] As far as the fine arts are concerned, artists are
forced to produce works that do not support religious views.
The situation of the smaller Churches, by comparison with
the Catholic church, is bad. In the Czech Republic there are 16
Churches and religious associations, all of which existed before
the communist takeover. In Slovakia the regime permits the
existence of 11 Churches and associations.[9] The small Churches
do not have any publications, although the names of their
representatives do appear from time to time in accounts of
various peace demonstrations. Despite the limited reform
undertaken in the course of 1968 {the restoration of the
Greek-Catholic Unitat Church), many groups continue to be
banned, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses (these denominations are
not listed in official statistics). The regime is particularly
suspicious of Churches and organizations that maintain links
with their fellow organizations in the noncommunist countries.
This applies to small religious associations, be they Unitarians
or Old Catholics, as well as to the Roman Catholic Church, but
above all to Jewish religious communities.[10] The regime is
hoping that these associations and religious communities will
gradually die out. The cultural life of such religious groups
is virtually nonexistent.

As for the age-related subcultures, it should be pointed
out that pop and rock music are said by the regime to discredit
young people in the eyes of the public and arrest their
development. Some records by selected rock groups, such as the
Roiling Stones, can be bought in Prague stores, but most can
only be bought at exorbitant prices on the black market.[11] The
more modern punk rock and hard rock has been subjected since
1982 to a consistent campaign to discredit it. A similar drive
was directed against the Jazz Section of the Czech Musicians'
Union.[12] In 1984 the section was officially disbanded,

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although it remains a member of the International Jazz
Federation, a branch of UNESCO. The spread of mass culture by
means of video equipment in Czechoslovakia has been proceeding
at a slow pace. Evidently the delay was caused not only by
technological and economic considerations but by ideological
ones, too.[13]

Openings Toward the West. Cultural exchanges with
Western countries frequently remain only on paper, and if they
materialize it is mainly the representatives of communist,
socialist, or nonaligned cultural groups that tend to be
invited. Czechoslovakia does not promote contacts with those
Western cultural or religious representatives who are viewed as
having an adverse ideological impact on the public (invitations
have not been extended, for example, to the Pope or Cardinals
Koenig and Glemp). The authorities have not encouraged the
dissemination of and access to various democratic channels of
Western culture. The Western noncommunist press is not on sale.
Literary works containing views not in accordance with official
ideology are censored and may not be imported or translated.
Broadcasts by Western radio stations, especially RFE/RL and
Radio Vatican, are jammed. Tourism to the Western countries is
limited both on economic and ideological grounds.

Czechoslovakia organizes several cultural international
festivals that are of a high quality, such as the Prague Spring
music festival (although this Is not as well attended by
internationally well-known musicians as in the past). The
reputation of the International Film Festival at Karlovy Vary
has declined in proportion to the falling number of entries and
because of the deterioration in their quality. Cultural and
religious exchanges of individuals and ideas are impossible
through official channels, and all unreported attempts at such
contacts are subject to legal prosecution. All cultural
exchange activities are directed and centrally controlled by
special organizations.

The Czechs and Slovaks still manage to preserve their
democratic tradition in the production of samizdat literature.
The Charter 77 human rights group Issues its monthly Informace
o Charte 77, which reports on current and past social and
political topics, the imprisonment of people on political
grounds, and other forms of persecution.[14] The most recent
Charter 77 declaration to the Budapest Forum condemns the
regime's cultural policy.[15] There Is the Committee for the
Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS), which documents
police actions against nonconformist citizens (house searches,
blackmail during interrogation, and so on) and other excesses of
communist justice. An unofficial monthly Informace o Cirkvi
[Information About the Church] and its Slovak counterpart
Nabozenstvo a Sucasnost reports on the persecution of priests
and believers and religious news from abroad and publishes

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speeches by the Pope and Cardinals as well as Christian poetry
and poems by political prisoners.[16] These are the main regular
sources of information, but there are also several minor
samizdat publications and some well known underground publishing
houses for books.[17]

Antonin Kratochvil

1 The main principles of Czechoslovak cultural and religious policy were
embodied in the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of 9 Hay 1949 and
in the new constitution of 11 June 1960; in the Law on Cultural Monuments,
no. 22, 17 April 1958; in the Law on the Setting up of the State Office for
Church Affairs, no. 217, 14 October 1949; and in the Law on Economic
Provision for Churches and Religious Organizations by the State, no. 218,
14 October 1949.

2 See Czechoslovak Situation Report/13, Radio Free Europe Research, 11 July
1984, item 3.

3 Katerina Ruttkayova, Bibliograficky Zebornik [Bibliographical
Compilation] (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1969), pp. 71-108; see also Jan
Bansky, Na Okraj Zvozu Klastoruych Kniznic na Zlovensku [On the Bringing
Together of the Monastery Libraries in Slovakia], (Martin: Matica
Slovenska, 1956, 100 copies for official use only).

4 See Czechoslovak SR/7, RFER, 19 April 1985, items 1 and 2.

5 See ibid., no.13, 3 August 1985, item 4.

6 See ibid., no.9 3 June 1985, item 6.

7 See ibid., no 3, 13 February 1985, item 3; and Antonin Kratochvil, "A
Survey of Czech and Slovak Literature," RAD Background Report/106
(Czechoslovakia), RFER, 13 September 1985.

8 Smena, 21 April 1984, p. 3.

9 CTK, Documentation Survey, no. 29, 9 July 1985.

10 Sea Czechoslovak SR/22, 20 December 1984, RFER, item 7.

11 UPI, Prague 19 April 1984.

12 The New Republic, 17 December 1984; The Washington Post, 18 June 1985.

13 See Czechoslovak SR/9, RFER, 3 June 1985, item 7.

14 See ibid, no.l, 11 January 1985, item 1.

15 Document of Charter 77, No. 24/1985, 25 September 1985.

16 See A. Kratochvil, "The Church in Czechoslovakia," RAD Background

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Report/78 (Czechoslovakia), RFER, 30 March 1982.

17 See A. Kratochvil, "Literature and the Politics of Culture in
Czechoslovakia in 1982," RAD Background Report/77 (Czechoslovakia), RFER,
11 April 1983.

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HUNGARY

Cultura1 Patrimony. The official Hungarian attitude to
the country's precommunist cultural and religious heritage is
the product of 40 years of evolution, starting from suppression
and neglect and ending with careful and selective
rehabilitation.

Upon coming to power in 1948, the communist regime set out
to create a new national tradition, which in the view of its
leaders demanded major ideological surgery to the nation's
cultural past. Proceeding from Gyorgy Lukacs's tenet that
"truly productive traditions can only evolve in the course of
revolutionary development,"[1] the regime's ideologues began a
systematic campaign to rid the nation's cultural heritage of
what they described as its "clerical-nationalist" aspects. As a
consequence, the treatment of that heritage came to be based
almost exclusively on political and ideological considerations.
Precommunist history and its depiction in literature and art was
seriously distorted. The importance of revolutionary and--often
only allegedly--class-struggle related events and personalities
was magnified, while "nonrevolutionary" and thus
"nonprogressive" figures, literature, and art received marginal
or falsified treatment at best. To make matters worse, a
natural link was implied between Hungary's "little Stalin"
Matyas Rakosi and such truly great heroes of Hungarian history
as Gyorgy Dozsa, Ferenc Rakoezi, and Lajos Kossuth. This
artificially contrived ideological bridge was a direct insult to
Hungarian national pride and was one of the many factors that
had led to the outbreak of the October 1956 revolution.

According to the current official view, 1956 was a radical
turning point in the way the country's historical and cultural
heritage was treated. The HSWP's cultural policy guidelines of
1958,[2] it is claimed, marked the beginning of a
"self-purification" process, characterized by a struggle against
"sectarian-dogmatic" tendencies, on the one hand, and
"revisionism" seeking to repudiate the achievements of the
1950s, on the other.[3] While the new cultural guidelines were,
indeed, designed to broaden the historical and cultural legacy
of the nation and did call for greater appreciation of its
traditions, the shift from a repressive, ideologically dominated
to a more objective set of criteria in assessing the country's
precommunist past has by no means been spectacular. While the
perimeters of tolerance have been broadened, much of that past
continues to fall outside or barely fits within those officially
set limits.

It was not until about four years ago, for example, that
after more than three-and-a-half decades of silence about his
life and work King Stephen I (St. Stephen), the founder of the
Hungarian state, was "rediscovered" and rehabilitated, though
still without mention of the fact that he had been canonized.[4]
Or to take a more recent example, the contribution to the

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national consciousness of Gyula Szekfu, the great historian of
the interwar period, is only now beginning to receive official
recognition, still with many footnotes and explanations.[5]

Many details of the precommunist past, therefore, are still
taboo for most Hungarian citizens. There are areas, however,
such as the protection of monuments, in which there has been a
more positive change in official attitudes. A founding member
of UNESCO's International Council of Monuments and Sites,
communist Hungary has earned a fair international reputation as
a preserver of historical architecture. In 1975, for example,
the town of Sopron was awarded the prestigious Europe Prize for
its restoration efforts, and in 1982 the sculptor Erno Szakal
received the same award for his work in the restoration of
Gothic buildings.[6]

Here, too, however, there are still problems. Although, in
a clear change from the policy of total neglect under Rakosi,
the Kadar regime now seems committed in principle to the
preservation of the country's historic treasures, its efforts
have been hampered by a chronic shortage of funds. Consequently,
it has been forced to adopt a selective approach concentrating,
primarily for practical reasons, on projects that are expected
to boost the country's tourist industry- One result of this
selective policy was that by the end of the 1970s many of
Hungary's 650 registered historical palaces and mansions were
either about to disappear completely (an estimated 15%) or were
in such a state of disrepair that today they could only be saved
at an exorbitant cost. Recent appeals for public contributions
and efforts to involve private enterprise in their
revitalization so far have only been partly successful.[7]

Ethnographic research and the fostering of folk traditions
have enjoyed even more consistent official support. While in the
late 1940s and early 1950s ethnographers were expected to
gather historical evidence that would enhance the revolutionary
image of the peasantry, in the past two decades the emphasis has
gradually shifted away from such ideological considerations to a
commitment to the preservation of folk traditions.[8]

Folk music with its purity and simplicity has always been a
source of special pride for noncommunist and communist regimes
alike in Hungary. Its systematic preservation and cultivation,
developed to an art by the composers Bela Bartok and Zoltan
Kodaly, has been carefully continued during the past four
decades. In March of this year, for example, the Patriotic
People's Front (PPF) in cooperation with the sponsors of the
annually held Mother Tongue Conference published an impressive
book containing a comprehensive collection of songs dating back
to the beginning of the Hungarian migration over 1,000 years
ago.[9] There is evidence today that popular interest in folk
traditions is on the rise. A renewed search seems to be under
way for the "pure source" of national identity. Within the past
five years, for example, there has been an extraordinary revival

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in the popularity of folk dancing in villages and towns alike.
With the support of the regime, for the fourth consecutive year
tens of thousands of mostly young dancers, singers, and

musicians have gathered in Budapest's Sports Arena to share and
show off their skills.[10]

After some years of improvement, it now appears that the
depiction of Hungary's precommunist past in films, plays, and
literature will again be kept within more strictly defined
bounds. In his speech before the HSWP Political Academy in
November 1984, Politburo member Gyorgy Aczel gave the following
justification for this imminent tightening:

It is natural that e people should face up to the dramas of
its history--particularly or the recent past--through the
use of art also. It is not, however, only schematism but
also counterschematism and the falsification of history
that hinder the criticism of that period. The distortion
is particularly conspicuous when some artists show far more
tolerance toward the Horthy regime than the "ill-famed"
1950s. We do not doubt that there were even forces in the
counterrevolutionary period with whom we can and do have
continuity. These forces, however, fought against the
oppressive regime and its conservatism. It is an insult to
our fellowship with them whenever a memoir or a work of art
suggests that we should embrace the entire period.[11]

Occasionally, however, one encounters officially sanctioned
developments that appear to run counter to the increasingly
frequently heard tough warnings. In 1984, for example, a great
many books were published about 19th century Hungary that
provided a nostalgically favorable look at the heyday of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.[12] Developments of this sort, which
occasionally even raise some eyebrows among Hungary's communist
neighbors, however, seldom indicate a permanent trend. They are
trial balloons released by a liberally autocratic regime wanting
desperately to be liked by the people under its control.

Cultural Diversity. From the point of view of its ethnic
make-up, Hungary is a relatively homogeneous country. National
minorities constitute less than 5% of its total population. Of
the country's 10,725,000 inhabitants 230,000 are of German,
100,000 of Slovak, and 95,000 of Southern Slav origin.[13] In
addition, the country has a Gypsy population of about
400,000.

Since coming to power, Hungary's communist regime has
followed a carefully balanced nationality policy aimed at
projecting an image of fairness. The establishment of
nationality federations under the auspices of the PPF,
proportional representation in the country's otherwise powerless
parliament, and support for--or at least tolerance of--minority

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cultures have been pointed to more and more often by the regime
as examples to be followed by the country's neighbors with large
Hungarian minorities.

One problem, however, that continues to haunt the regime is

the plight of the Gypsies.[14] After decades of social,
political, and cultural efforts, characterized at times by
sincere but ill-advised measures and at times by intolerance and
impatience, the problem remains a blemish on the regime's
otherwise good record in dealing with minorities.

Church-state relations in Hungary are based on a series of
specific bilateral agreements[15] signed between October and
December 1946 in the case of the Reformed (Calvinist),
Unitarian, and Lutheran Churches and of the Jewish community and
on 30 August 1950 in the case of the Roman Catholic Church,
Under the post-1956 Kadar regime, the initial period of official
repression and ideological intolerance has been replaced by the
gradual abandonment of confrontation between the state and the
Churches and the inauguration of a period of dialogue and
cooperation based on a series of pragmatic concessions on both
sides.

Although the communist state has shown no intention of
relinquishing its monopoly of power, it now feels increasingly
compelled, in view of growing domestic pressures and the
deterioration of the international climate, to solicit the
cooperation and support of the Church. The future of
Church-state relations will depend on the ability of the various
parties involved to reconcile their differing objectives to
their mutual benefit.

Openings Toward the West. "Starting from the 1960s,"
claimed Minister of Culture Bela Kopeczi in a recent interview,
"Hungarian cultural life has really opened up to all
intellectual values and genuine new trends, regardless of
whether they originated in the East or in the West."[16]
Although the facts do not quite bear out Kopeczi's unqualified
claim, he is right in that the Hungary of today is an
incomparably more open society than the Hungary of 30 to 35
years ago. The consolidation of the Kadar regime, the
subsequent relaxation of the political atmosphere, the economic
reforms, and the communications revolution are only some of the
factors that have contributed to this development. The basic
question, however, remains whether this relative openness is
really an extraordinary achievement for which the Hungarian
people should for ever be grateful or whether it is merely an
encouraging step in the right direction toward the ultimate
removal of all artificial cultural barriers. The official view,
as expressed by Kopeczi, appears to embrace the first
interpretation. Some people in the regime have even attempted
to show that Hungary's cultural open-door policy has not been
adequately reciprocated in the West.

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For example, in a recent interview with the semiofficial
daily Magyar Hirlap, Deputy Foreign Minister Jozsef Benyi
bitterly complained that the imbalance to the detriment of
Hungary in cultural relations with certain unnamed (Western)
countries was so great "that it comes close to being an insult
to our national pride.[17] Earlier this year, the trade union
daily Nepszava expressed similar concerns, pointing out that
in January and February, even without counting the musicals
Cats and Applause, as many as 15 or 16 plays had been staged
in Budapest theaters that were written by living American and
British playwrights, compared with only 9 Hungarian plays.[18]
During the same period, the paper pointed out, theaters in
London had staged only five plays by non-Anglo-Saxon writers,
including a "half" Hungarian play, a British adaptation of a
Ferenc Molnar comedy.

To add more weight to his contention that Hungary has
contributed more than its share to facilitating international
cultural understanding and cooperation, Benyi pointed with pride
to the fact that the number of foreign tourists visiting Hungary
each year (about one-third of them from the West)[19] far
exceeded the size of the country's population. Citizens of the
neighboring countries (including Austria), he added, did not
need a visa to enter Hungary, and 70% of Hungarian television
viewers were also able to watch foreign programs (not all
Western, of course).[20]

Despite the ideal picture painted by officials, however,
the accessibility of Western culture is still far from being
adequate. One need only look at the endless lines in front of
movie houses and theaters when a new Western film or play
appears or the crowds in bookstores following the publication of
a previously unavailable Western novel to appreciate the extent
of the populace's insatiable hunger for Western culture. Western
newspapers and magazines continue to be unobtainable for most
Hungarians, as they are still only sold in the lobbies of major
hotels to foreigners.

While in terms of volume and numbers their availability is
indeed notable (especially compared with the situation in the
neighboring communist countries), Western cultural products are
still "picked over" according to carefully applied ideological
criteria before they reach the public. Consequently, the image
projected of the West through these products is often a sadly
distorted, shallow picture that contributes little to genuine
cultural understanding between East and West.

For many in the regime, however, even this relative
openness has become intolerable. In a position paper issued in
October 1984 by the Theoretical Study Group for Culture attached
to the HSWP CC, the members called for greater vigilance and a

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"better critical selection" in controlling the importation of
the "products of bourgeois 'mass culture,'" for many "are
unacceptable both in terms of quality and in terms of the
ideological and political impact of the values they
project."[21]

Steven Koppany

* * *

1 As quoted in Nepszava, 11 January 1984.

2 Adopted at the HSWP CC meeting of October 1958. A Szocializmus Utjan [On
the Road to Socialism] (Budapest: Akademia Publishers, 1970), p. 190.

3 Nepszava, 11 January 1984.

4 See Hungarian Situation Report/11, Radio Free Europe Research, 11 October
1984, item 5.

5 Istvan Soter, "About Our National Identity," Uj Iras, December 1984, pp.
8-14.

6 Weekly Bulletin (MTI), 21 March 1984.

7 Otlet, 9 May 1985.

8 Mozgo Vilag, February 1985, pp. 108-112.

9 Esti Hirlap, 19 March 1985.

10 Film Szinhaz Muzsika, 4 May 1985.

11 Nepszabadsag, 3 November 1984.

12 Sunday Times, 31 December 1984.

13 Gerhard Seewann, "Minority Questions Been from Budapest's Viewpoint,"
Suedosteuropa, vol. 33, no. 1, 1984, pp. 1-14.

14 For more details about the regime's policy toward the Gypsies, see
Hungarian 5Rs/6 and 3, RFER, 22 April 1983 and 4 September 1985, items 3
and 2, respectively.

15 See Imre Miklos, "About the Four Decades of Church Policy of the Hungarian
People's Republic," Kulpolitika, no. 4, pp. 80-101.

16 Jelkep, no. 3, 1985, pp. 5-12.

17 Magyar Hirlap, 14 September 1985.

18 27 February 1985.
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19 Statisztikai Evkonyv [Statistical Yearbook] (Budapest: Kozponti
Statisztikai Hivatal, 1983), p. 220.

20 Magyar Hirlap, 14 September 1985.

21 Nepszabadsag, 20 October 1984.

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POLAND

Cultural Patrimony. The official attitude toward the
precommunist cultural heritage in Poland has been cautiously
manipulative. Its main purpose is to neutralize aspirations for
democracy and true national independence and to prove the
inevitability and superiority of communism.[1] Polish history is
replete with wars and insurrections, bravery, and sacrifice,
including numerous heroes and symbols of freedom and
independence that have been used repeatedly in more recent
struggles against the current regime. For this reason the names
of certain prominent historical figures, dates that symbolize
Poland's strivings for independence and democracy, and even
mention of the Warsaw Uprising have been particularly sensitive.

After August 1980, however, certain changes took place in
the Polish cultural consciousness that even martial law and
repressions since have not been able to reverse.[2] The 16
months of uncensored publishing by Solidarity dealt with many of
the blank pages from Polish history. Their treatment has
continued in the underground press. The official Polish press
now includes discussions on Pilsudski and the significance of
the Warsaw Uprising, yet spontaneous observances of the prewar
Polish independence day, November 11, or the date of the signing
of the Constitution of May 3rd are still not tolerated. They
remain, along with various Solidarity anniversaries, as sure
rallying points for demonstrations of current dissatisfactions.

Monuments and mementos of history were rebuilt and restored
(selectively) after the damage of the war. The old sections of
Gdansk and Warsaw, for instance, were rebuilt, but without the
royal castle in Warsaw. It was still too much a symbol of
independence and sovereignty; and it was not until the early
1970s that work was begun on the restoration of the castle. Its
400 rooms are nearing completion largely from donations from
abroad. Many, if not all, of the most valuable and oldest
buildings and monuments in Poland are in disrepair and in danger
of further deterioration because of pollution. Factories and
steel mills have been built since the war much too near the most
valuable national monuments, with inadequate plans for pollution
control. Great care was also taken to retrieve Polish national
art treasures, but museums are inadequate and valuable pieces
have been lost and others are in danger of destruction from age
and improper storage.[3]

Folklore and regional cultural traditions are studied,
displayed in ethnographic museums, and exported in the form of
arts and crafts produced or collected by the state agency
Cepelia or through the performances of professional dance
ensembles, such as Mazowsze and Slask. The emphasis on folklore
is to show an anthropological base for the sovereign state of
Poland, There is much lip service given to the notion that
Poland is independent of the Soviet Union.

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Folklore also plays a role in a curious outreach agency of
the Polish government, the Polonia Agency. This agency was
founded in 1955 to reach out to the 12,000,000 people of Polish
descent around the world and to attract them back to their
"homeland," either permanently, or for visits. Exchange
programs are arranged as well as excursions, dance festivals,
special contests, and so on. This agency also gives special
attention to students of Polish background studying in Poland
and offers special scholarships and summer school sessions in a
variety of courses, including cooking, theater, economics,
language, and literature. As was stated by a Polish foreign
ministry official: "Culture is the most enduring link between
Polonia and the homeland."[4]

Current Cultural Development and Contacts with the West.
Poland's cultural heritage is entwined with Western cultural
development. More recently, Edward Gierek's economic policies
not only attracted western credits and trade possibilities, but
also encouraged travel and other contacts with the West. The
general economic crisis and particularly the sharp cutbacks in
credits and Western currency funds have of course taken their
toll and have affected cultural life and education. Universities
have little funding for foreign equipment or subscriptions to
Western academic journals. Meanwhile, the Central Committee of
the PUWP has been preparing material on a cultural program to be
presented at its 10th Congress. These include a discussion on
the role and place of the intelligentsia in society and on
modifications to the system of training cultural and educational
cadres.[3]

In July 1985 the government enacted amendments to the
Higher Education Law affecting more than 80 institutions of
higher education in Poland to ban unauthorized political
activity and to remove dissident academics. The new law gives
the Minister of Higher Education and Technology unprecedented
powers to regulate academic life, including the appointment of
professors without the usual academic qualifications and without
consulting the universities and transferring younger instructors
to other institutions. Oaths of loyalty to the Polish
Constitution will now be required for advancement as well as
overt political criteria in the awarding of doctorates. Junior
staff and students have been removed from university senates.
This attack on academic freedom has had a dramatic effect on the
morale of both students and instructors, who are concerned about
their careers and all those who sense that political reliability
rather than intellectual performance is to be the criterion for
future scholarly development.[6]

After August 1980 certain irreversible changes took place
in the political consciousness of intellectuals, especially
writers, artists, and actors. During the 16 months when
Solidarity was still legal there was a proliferation of creative
activity. After martial law was introduced on 13 December 1981
many intellectuals distanced themselves from official

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activities, boycotting all forms of the mass media, especially
television. Most noted was the retreat of famous television
personalities, but the boycott affected all the creative
professions, involving writers, scholars, artists, musicians,
and actors.

The authorities suspended all cultural and professional
associations. New, officially sponsored associations were
imposed by the authorities to replace the old ones. But these
new associations have been shunned by most of the
self-respecting--and respected--members of the intelligentsia,
many deciding to emigrate to the West rather than submit to the
creative paralysis of living under the dictates of the regime.
Others are engaged in "internal emigration," removing themselves
from any official institutions and organizations and working for
Church-sponsored programs or moving into privately owned
businesses.

A great deal is still being done, however, by those
cultural leaders who feel that it is up to them to take
responsibility for the fate of their national culture. According
to the recent Solidarity report, these artists and writers are
still refusing to take part in the "official lies of the
authorities"--especially in anything connected with the
government-controlled mass media, or with the new institutions
that are merely cultural "facades for propaganda" or with
programs specially prepared for propaganda purposes.

There are artists, however, who devote their time and
energy to state-run publishing houses, theaters, museums, and
film studios and who struggle to maintain their integrity
despite censorship or administrative limitations. These
restrictions have taken the form of removing theater directors
and museum directors, rearranging editorial boards, and
tightening censorship regulations.

The authorities have not been very successful in their
campaign against culture. Those actors boycotting television
productions are active in the theater, for example. The Church
has also taken on a new role as protector of the national
culture. Numerous cultural programs are being presented
throughout the country on Church premises, including concerts,
discussions, and poetry readings. In 1984 alone there were 15
large art exhibitions in which more than 580 artists
participated as well as 45 one-man shows.

On the official scene the authorities are busy organizing
international festivals, each presented as another successful
step on the road to "normalization." Recently they have
organized the International Biennial Graphics Exhibition in
Cracow, the International Biennial Poster Exhibition in Warsaw,
and the International Book Fair also in Warsaw--all at a great
cost in order to give the impression that Polish artists are
taking part in the international cultural scene. In fact,

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RAD BR/117

Poland's import of Western publications has stopped completely
and Polish artists are often refused passports.

Simultaneously, the authorities have taken steps to stress
the "cultural integration of socialist countries," by holding
"Soviet Culture Days" in Warsaw, a Soviet Song Festival in
Zielona Gora, and a Festival of Arts from Socialist Countries in
Szczecin. This "integration" imposed from above tends to
attract lesser-known artists from other countries as well as
from Poland.

There is much concern over the general state of cultural
affairs in Poland since martial law, as it seems to many that
under the guise of a lack of appropriate funds the authorities
are attempting to steer cultural development in a direction that
suits their political objectives. For example, book publishing
has declined to 4.5 books per inhabitant per year. This
includes 45,000,000 propaganda brochures and approximately the
same number of school textbooks. This leaves only one book of
another sort published per inhabitant. In addition, there were
108 fewer new titles published in 1983 than in the previous year
and 350 fewer than had been planned. In 1985 there will be 10%
less paper allotted for books, and 13% less paper for
newspapers. The book publishing industry is deteriorating.
There are no provisions for the upkeep and replacement of
equipment. In 1983 printers requested $7,000,000. In 1984
their needs rose to $14,800,000 and they received only
$2,600,000. The turnover time for a book of poetry is three
years, for a scholarly work, eight; yet certain authors who
serve the regime wait only three to four weeks. Moreover,
publishers cancelled more than 200 contracts with current
authors.

The film industry has felt the effects of stringent
controls as well. Professional associations were dissolved,
including the Committee to Save Cinematography, Directors of
the most successful and productive film studios were dismissed,
including Andrzej Wajda. Numerous completed films were shelved
and censorship tightened; many topics have been banned,
including the Polish national insurrections of the 19th century.

Some historical theater buildings are in catastrophic
disrepair while in others safety precautions have been
disregarded. This was cited as one of the reasons for the fire
that broke out in the National Theater in Warsaw. In addition,
new theaters are often built in areas that are not the most
accessible. Numerous theater companies, such as Grotowski's
Experimental Theater in Wroclaw, have no funding allocated for
decoration, staging, costumes, or travel. During martial law,
several theater directors were removed, including Gustav
Holoubek (Dramatic Theater in Warsaw) and Andrzej Jarecki
(Variety Theater in Warsaw).

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RAD BR/117

The measure of repression in the arts and culture in Poland
can best be judged by the proliferation of activity by
independent groups and publishers. The underground press exists
in nearly every large city. Over 650 separate titles of
publications have been counted.[7] These publishers produce both
political and general works, reprinting classics unobtainable
through normal Polish sources, e.g., Orwell, Solzhenitsyn,
Vaclav Havel, Simone Weil, and so on. These publishing efforts
include the assistance of thousands of volunteers who take part
in the various stages of printing, binding, and distributing. A
Committee of Independent Culture was established in 1983 drawing
members from various independent organizations and recognized by
Solidarity officials underground,, This committee coordinates
efforts and collects donations for the promotion of cultural
efforts. It aids in communications among various publishers and
publishes a monthly, entitled Kultura Niezalezna [Independent
Culture].

In spite of the Polish government's attempts to stifle
normal cultural development, society has found ways to further
its national culture, even more aware today of the dangers of
government controls.

S. M. M.

* * *

1 See Janusz Bugajski, "Fact is Stranger than Fiction: Official Manipulation
of Polish History," RAD Background Report/139 (Poland), Radio Free Europe
Research, 31 July 1984.

2 Poland: Five Years Since August (published by the Inter-Factory
Solidarity Organization "V," l985), chapter III.

3 See Polish Situation Report/15, RFER, 27 September 1985, item 3.

4 Trybune Ludu, 1 December 1982.

5 See Polish SR/7, RFER, 29 April 1985, item 3; and Radio Warsaw, 20
September 1985, 11:00 p.m.

6 UPI, 2 October 1985.

7 Poland: Five Years Since August, op. cit.

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ROMANIA

Cultural Patrimony. The present regime's policy on
Romania's cultural heritage is part of the attempt to mold the
national consciousness into a communist shape as well as to
reconcile the public to the regime* Since coming to power the
Communists have attached great importance, at least in theory,
to the country's cultural heritage in an attempt to demonstrate
the regime's commitment to national values and traditions and to
Romanian sovereignty. As some of the taboos and restrictions
imposed on Romanian culture by the Soviets were gradually
removed earlier,[1] a "re-evaluation of the re-evaluation" of
Romania's cultural heritage began in the mid-1970s. A
considerable number of important philosophical, historical, and
literary works that had been prohibited in the 1950s and 1960s
were reprinted. A debate in the official press was carried on
between those who proposed a reissuing of all the formerly
banned works and ideological hard-liners who insisted on
ideological criteria to prevail over national ones.[2]
Unfortunately, national history and culture are now increasingly
used as a vehicle to promote support for the party and
Ceausescu. This is why the regime's "dacomania" and the
tendency of putting historical truth to the "service of
momentary political interests" has met with opposition from
Romanian historians.[3]

Another contradiction between the party's official cultural
policy and the actual situation involves the conservation and
restoration of national monuments. Many architectural landmarks
in towns and villages are either in disrepair (often following
natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes) or razed in the
course of the regime's unbridled modernization and
systematization drive. Opposition to this policy by the
country's Directorate for the National Cultural Patrimony led to
its disbanding in December 1977; subsequently the responsibility
for the maintenance and restoration of monuments was shifted to
the local county councils.[4] Protest by Romanian architects and
writers against this practice has been voiced since 1977, and it
became particularly vocal following the demolition, started in
1984, of a traditional Bucharest quarter in the course of which
several churches and a great number of residential villas were
destroyed.[5] Hot only churches, castles, and memorial homes,
but also libraries and art collections are in a state of
disarray. Yet the poor financial situation of the local bodies
entrusted with the conservation of monuments is not the only
reason behind the sad state of preservation. Ceausescu's
aversion to religion, for example, no doubt contributes to the
neglect of religious monuments. The prohibition on visits of
schoolchildren to the Moldavian monasteries and the deletion of
monasteries from official Romanian excursion itineraries[6] are
good examples of this.

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RAD BR/117

After backing away from the antinational, Stalinist
cultural policy, the Romanian official attitude toward folklore
changed as well. Many collections of old songs have been
published and there is even an officially sponsored campaign to
incorporate folk traditions, even Christian ones, into
mainstream culture.[7] Unfortunately, however, these traditions
are often adulterated by communist ideology so that they lose
almost all resemblance to their roots? witness the maudlin "Hymn
to Romania" festival.

More or less remote aspects of Romanian history are being
incorporated into the literature and arts of today. Not only are
writers and artists called upon by the regime to make history a
major topic of their work, they are even told how to proceed in
doing so. As a result the books written since the announcement
of the so-called "National Epic" campaign in the 1970s are often
felt to debase national values because of their proregime
bias.[8]

Cultural Diversity. Romania's nationality and religious
policy stands out by the contradictions evident not only between
words and deeds, but also between propagandistic assertions made
for foreign consumption and hard-line ideological pronouncements
meant for internal use. The official claim has it that
according to the constitution and following Romania's
ratification of the UN Human Rights Charter and the Helsinki
Final Act, Romania is granting equal economic, social,
political, and cultural rights to national minorities and
religious freedom to its 14 recognized denominations and cults.
There is, however, a clear-cut contrast between these principles
and the officially sanctioned goals of "homogenizing" the
Romanian population and of fighting so-called "mysticism" and
"obscurantism" (i.e., religion). Officially, the minorities
recognized as such (the Gypsies, for instance, though in great
numbers, do not belong to this category) are granted the right
to tuition in their own language, newspapers and magazines,
theaters, cultural centers, and special publishing houses. Over
the past decade, however, discontent has been growing among
Hungarian and German nationals because of what is perceived as a
trend toward limiting their constitutionally guaranteed minority
rights and even endangering their national identity and
traditions. Moves such as the prohibition of minority-language
place names, the de facto confiscation of minority Church
archives under the Law of Cultural Patrimony (1974), the recent
cancellation of the television and radio broadcasts of the
national minorities, and the official restrictions on the import
of books and periodicals from Hungary transgress Romania's
commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. The ever growing
national assertiveness of the Ceausescu regime is felt as
diminishing the recognition of the value and impact of minority
cultural achievements. More recently, not only Germans and
Hungarians, but also members of the Jewish community have felt
official and unofficial expressions of Romanian national pride
as offensive and discriminatory.

[page 37]

RAD BR/117

In response to the tremendous influence Pope John Paul II
has had in Poland since 1980, the Romanian leadership has
embarked on a renewed antireligious campaign, discouraging signs
of religiosity and stepping up the harassment of individual
priests and believers. Apparently the national Orthodox Church
with its highly subservient hierarchy[9] is faring better than
the Protestant denominations (consisting mainly of ethnic
Hungarians and Germans) and the neo-Protestant sects. Protest
has been voiced over the lack of bibles in the languages of the
national minorities. There have also been complaints about
fewer possibilities for the minorities to study abroad, as
compared with thoses of the Orthodox Church members, for
example.[10] More recently, the situation of the Roman Catholic
Church has improved slightly through the appointment of an
Apostolic Administrator for the Bucharest Archbishopric.

Openings Toward the West. Romania claims to be carrying
out an open policy of cultural exchange and cooperation toward
the East, West, and South. There are, however, two
reservations: an ideological one (which, as is emphasized in
Bucharest, is not a "bloc" one)[11] and one that concerns the
Third World. Romania is siding with the developing countries in
their claims for the recognition of a "new cultural world order"
granting equal recognition to small, peripheral cultures. They
are calling for reciprocity in exchanges and translations,
criticize the alleged brain-drain by the industrialized
countries and the appropriation of small nations' cultural
heritage by more powerful countries.[12]

During the more liberal era of the 1960s and even through
the 1970s, many Western books were translated into Romanian,
there were performances of Western movies and plays, and
cultural exchanges were encouraged.[13] An investigation
published in a literary monthly[14] showed that over 90% of
Romanian citizens possessing a television set tuned into British
and American television serials such as Colombo, Mannix, and
even Dallas. Romania was the first Eastern bloc country to
allow the opening of a West German cultural institute in
Bucharest in 1979, after the Italians and the French had opened
libraries in 1969 and the Americans theirs in 1972. Yet whereas
Romanian libraries were set up in Rome and in New York, Romania
has not opened corresponding institutes in either Paris or
Munich.

Following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act ten years
ago, Romania pledged support for the conclusion of more
interstate agreements, more organized contacts between scholars
and artists, more translations, more support for foreign
journalists, and so on.[15] The National Center for the
Promotion of Friendship and Cooperation with Other Peoples was
set up in March 1978 in order to enhance Romania's cultural
propaganda abroad and coordinate contacts with foreign
countries. This policy did not, however, materialize following
Elena Ceausescu's accession to the chairmanship of the National

[page 38]

RAD BR/117

Council of Science and Technology in June 1979, and after this
body had taken over the overall guidance of the entire scholarly
activity of the country.[16]

Moreover, as part of the RCP CC cadre commission, Elena
Ceausescu decides who is to go abroad and who is to accept a
Western scholarship or not. It has become much more difficult
since then for artists and scholars to be invited to go to the
West on an individual basis, the regime preferring to dispatch
tested party activists to seminars and poetry readings. The
cultural attaches with Romanian embassies abroad are staffed
with the same category of party people. Complaints have been
voiced in the West about the fact that Romanian students were
not allowed to accept western scholarships extended to them.

Availing itself of the pretext of the country's post-1980
financial crisis, the regime has cut almost all hard currency
subvention to publishing houses, theaters, cinemas, and
television, a move that makes the further import of Western
books, periodicals, movies, and telelvision serials virtually
impossible. With the hard currency shortage (which, however,
has not prevented an ever increasing number of translations of
Ceausescu's works to be published abroad) as an excuse, this
restrictive policy seems to have been prompted mainly by the
regime's growing awareness of ideological contamination from the
West and a pervasive anti-intellectual Bias.[17]

Anneli Maier

* * *

1 Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Partei and Literatur in Rumaenien sait 1945 [The
Party and Literature in Romania since 1945] (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag,
1975), pp. 112-121 and 139-141.

2 See Romanian Situation Reports/6 and 15, Radio Free Europe Research,
8 March 1978 and 20 October 1980, item 8 in both cases.

3 Ibid., no. 16, 16 September 1979, item 6.

4 Ibid., no. 19, 1 August 1978, item 8.

5 Ibid., no. 16, 2 November 1984, item 5.

6 Ibid., no. 25, 15 December 1981, item 1.

7 Anneli Maier, "Final Preparations for the Congress on Political Education
and Culture," RAD Background Report/123 (Romania), RFER, 31 May 1976.

8 See Romanian SRs/46 and 10, RFER, 12 December 1975 and 22 July 1980, items
2 and 7, respectively.

[page 39]

RAD BR/117

9 Ibid., nos, 13 and 5, 20 September 1984 and 13 March 1985, items 8 and
5, respectively.

10 Glaube in der Zweiten Welt, no. 2, 1964.

11 See Romanian SR/14, RFER, 8 August 1979, item 5.

12 Ibid., nos. 14 and 15, 15 January 1975 and 2 September 1985, item 5 and
4, respectively.

13 Ibid., no. 45, 20 November 1975, item 1.

14 Viata Romaneasca, no. 5, 1980.

15 Agerpres, 19 August 1975.

16 See Romanian SR/8, RFER, 1 April 1978, item 7; and ibid., no. 5, 13
May 1980, item 9.

17 Ibid., nos. 14 and 22, 10 October 1980 and 27 December 1982, items 7 and
4, respectively.

- end -

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